Teaching
- ECA002: Principles of Microeconomics
- ECC005: Industrial Economics
Luke’s current research uses advanced game theoretic techniques to model the incentives of firms, with the aims of explaining real-world business behaviour and improving competition policy and consumer protection policy that regulates firms’ behaviour.
Research interests
- Industrial organisation
- Competition policy
- Consumer policy
- Behavioural economics
Refereed journal articles
- “Explicit vs Tacit Collusion: The Effects of Firm Numbers and Asymmetries,” (2018) International Journal of Industrial Organization, 56(1), 1-25 (with Olczak, M.)
- “Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms,” (2017) Journal of Industrial Economics, 65(3), 654-682 (with Olczak, M.)
- “Early Settlement in European Merger Control,” (2016), Journal of Industrial Economics, 64(1), 27-63 (with Lyons, B.)
- “Default Effects, Transaction Costs and Imperfect Information,” (2013), Economics Letters, 119(2), 213-215 (with Munro, A. and Wilson, C. M.)
- “Collusive Price Rigidity under Price-Matching Punishments,” (2012), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(5), 471-482